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HONDURAN MILITARY CULTURE
By Orlando J. Pérez and Randy Pestana
April 2016

The FIU-USSOUTHCOM Academic Partnership
Military Culture Series
Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy (FIU-JGI) and FIU’s
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center (FIU-LACC), in collaboration with the United
States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), formed the FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic Partnership. The
partnership entails FIU providing research-based knowledge to further USSOUTHCOM’s understanding
of the political, strategic, and cultural dimensions that shape military behavior in Latin America and the
Caribbean. This goal is accomplished by employing a military culture approach. This initial phase of
military culture consisted of a year-long research program that focused on developing a standard analytical
framework to identify and assess the military culture of three countries. FIU facilitated professional
presentations of two countries (Cuba and Venezuela) and conducted field research for one country
(Honduras).
The overarching purpose of the project is two-fold: to generate a rich and dynamic base of knowledge
pertaining to political, social, and strategic factors that influence military behavior; and to contribute to
USSOUTHCOM’s Socio-Cultural Analysis (SCA) Program. Utilizing the notion of military culture,
USSOUTHCOM has commissioned FIU-JGI to conduct country-studies in order to explain how Latin
American militaries will behave in the context of U.S. military engagement.
The FIU research team defines military culture as “the internal and external factors—historical, cultural,
social, political, economic—that shape the dominant values, attitudes, and behaviors of the military
institution, that inform how the military views itself and its place and society, and shapes how the military
may interact with other institutions, entities, and governments.” FIU identifies and expounds upon the
cultural factors that inform the rationale behind the perceptions and behavior of select militaries by
analyzing its historical evolution, its sources of identity and sources of pride, and its role in society.
To meet the stated goals, FIU’s JGI and LACC hosted academic workshops in Miami and brought subject
matter experts together from throughout the U.S. and Latin America and the Caribbean, to explore and
discuss militaries in Latin America and the Caribbean. When possible, FIU-JGI researchers conduct field
research in select countries to examine these factors through in-depth interviews, focus groups, and/or
surveys. At the conclusion of each workshop and research trip, FIU publishes a findings report, which is
presented at USSOUTHCOM.
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The following Honduran Military Culture Findings Report, authored by Orlando J. Pérez and Randy
Pestana, is the product of a research trip to Honduras in February 2016 and months of empirical research.
Field research included interviews at the Universidad de Defensa de Honduras, Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de Honduras (UNAH), Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa (ASJ), and the U.S. Embassy
in Tegucigalpa. Additionally, the authors wish to thank Dr. Richard L. Millett for providing a historical
analysis of the Honduran Armed Forces.
The views expressed in this findings report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of the U.S. government, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Southern Command,
FIU-JGI, Florida International University, or the institutional affiliations of the participants.
On behalf of FIU-JGI and FIU-LACC, we wish to acknowledge and thank all who assisted in the
production of this piece including all those interviewed in Honduras.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Honduran Armed Forces have been closely linked to the political system since the state’s
independence in 1838.
 The first remanences of professional fighting forces in Honduras were departmental militia groups
closely linked to local politicians. In this period, successful assertion to military power required
relations with victorious political factions.
 The transition to a professional military institution led to increased ties between the military and
more conservative political blocs; notably the National Party. Evidence of this relationship remains
today.
 The 1956 coup of Julio Lozano Díaz served as the military’s entrance into the political arena. The
subsequent 1957 Constitution provided that the Honduran Armed Forces would be an autonomous
state institution and would serve as such for the next three decades.
 The transition to democracy did little to release the military’s hold on the political system in
Honduras. It would not be until the post-Cold War period that the military would “return to the
barracks.” This did not, however, dissuade military leadership from forming close alliances with
the executive.
 Personal and political relationships between the president and the military leadership continue to
shape civil-military relations in Honduras. President Hernández has promoted military officers
considered loyal to his political project, and has appointed many military officers to government
positions.
The United States is responsible for the professionalization of the Honduran Armed Forces in the postWWII period.
 No other military institution—or country for that matter—has had as close relations with the
Honduran military than the United States. Increased military aid and training both professionalized
and institutionalized the military.
 The threat of communism combined with U.S. interests in the Honduran banana industry saw
increased political, security, and economic support from the United States. Honduras served as the
geostrategic headquarters for U.S. foreign policy in Central America and in the fight against
communism.
The role of the Honduran Armed Forces has shifted since its professionalization.
 Communist threats in neighboring Central American states justified the existence and expansion
of the Honduran military. In turn, the military developed an outward facing security perspective
where military leadership was more conscious of external threats than of internal conflict.
 The 1969 Soccer War with El Salvador confirmed the military leadership’s contention that the
greatest threat to state sovereignty was external. The war would lead to an arms race between the
two militaries, and a rivalry that remains prevalent today.
 The 1980s contra war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua sustained the external focus of the
Honduran military. This period also strengthened ties between Honduras and the United States;
this partnership remains the strongest in the region.
 The post-Cold War period forced the Honduran Armed Forces to justify their existence without
true external threats. The military pointed to border conflicts with El Salvador as a threat to state
sovereignty, but would eventually reduce the size of its forces.
 The ineptitude of the National Police has forced the military to take on non-traditional roles that
the military feels is beneath them. Nevertheless, the military remains ready to handle these duties
until the police are reformed.
4

Sources of identity of the Honduran Armed Forces are based on sovereignty and pride.
 Honduran military beliefs are conditioned by historical relations with its neighbors and the United
States. Its weariness of intentions of neighbors—primarily El Salvador—still influence the
attitudes of the military.
 The Honduran Armed Forces are proud of their constitutionally defined role as protector of the
state and constitution. This elevates its perceived importance where the military would do
whatever is necessary to protect Honduras against internal and external threats.
 Military officers are wary of performing police functions but dutiful in their loyalty to the civilian
elected executive and the constitution which provides for the military’s role in assisting the police.
The military is the second highest trusted institution in Honduras behind the Evangelical Church.
 This level of trust speaks to citizens’ respect of the military as a professionalized state institution
unlike other “political” institutions susceptible to corruption.
 There is a significant gap between trust in the military and trust in the police. Over 64 percent trust
the military as compared to 46 percent for the police.
 Over 80 percent of Hondurans support the military’s involvement in domestic security roles. This
could be related to both the ineptitude of the police forces and the perceived integrity of the
military.
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THE HONDURAN MILITARY IN PERSPECTIVE
The Honduran Armed Forces are the most trusted state institution in Honduras. In many ways, the
Honduran military sees itself as the vanguard of the state, protecting Honduras from external actors that
seek to disrespect its dignity and challenge its sovereignty. Honduras was never faced with the levels of
internal conflict seen in neighboring Central American states; instead it maintained an outward facing
perspective of security responsibilities. The United States is largely responsible for the professionalization
of the Honduran Armed Forces from politicized militias seeking to acquire power to the only institution
trusted to handle the emerging security threats facing the state.
Since Honduras’ transition to democracy, the armed forces have diminished in size, but not in
responsibility. Today, this outward security perspective remains, but the challenges facing the state have
shifted. The ineptitude of the Honduran National Police combined with the perceived strength of the
Honduran Armed Forces has led the military to take on police duties, albeit a responsibility the military
feels is beneath them. Nevertheless, the Honduran Armed Forces are ready and willing to protect the state
against all threats as directed by its leadership.
Over the next several years, the Honduran Armed Forces will continue to be thrust into nontraditional roles until the National Police is successfully reformed; a transformation unlikely to occur in
the next decade despite optimism by the Juan Orlando Hernández administration (2014-present).
Questions remain, however, as to whether the military will fall prey to the corruption and human rights
abuses that plagued the police. Nevertheless, the Honduran Armed Forces are prepared to assist the state
in confronting the threats facing the nation.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE HONDURAN ARMED FORCES
History has shaped the way in which the Honduran Armed Forces behave today in three ways. First, the
foundations and evolution of the Honduran military politicized the institution. The years following
Honduran independence saw a lack of professional forces. Instead, the only remnants of a military
establishment were departmental militias linked to caudillo politicians seeking to gain power. This
politicization increased following the professionalization of the armed forces after WWII, and its growth
into an autonomous state institution thereafter.
Second, the relationship with the United States served to professionalize and institutionalize the
Honduran Armed Forces. The opening of the Escuela Militar Francisco Morazán in 1952 gave the
military legitimacy and the needed training to be recognized and respected as a true military institution.
With time, however, this relationship changed from one of cooperation to more of a transactional
6

relationship; one in which cooperation seemed contingent on the ability of the U.S. to provide resources
to the state.
Finally, the Honduran Armed Forces are proud of their mission, namely the protection of the
nation’s territorial integrity and adherence to the constitution. The Honduran military’s duties are
explicitly outlined within the constitution they are sworn to protect, but experiences with external actors
(i.e., communism, El Salvador, and Nicaragua), and lack of internal conflicts as seen in neighboring
countries, led the military to look outward for threats rather than inward. Further, the failure of the police
to handle domestic security has forced the military to take on non-traditional roles.

Politicization of the Honduran Armed Forces
During the period of state formation, Honduras had a limited military apparatus and lacked the
resources and capabilities to develop one. Following independence in 1838, Honduras became the poorest
of the five new republics with limited exports and a weak oligarchy. In turn, the Honduran military as an
“institution” was merely departmental militia lists used during episodes of conflict.

1

Military

mobilizations coincided with political elections, with young political leaders declaring themselves
commander-in-chief and confirmed by winning factions. 2 Consequently, military and political structures
paralleled each other with the armed forces more symbolic than real.
The late 1800s and early 1900s saw the establishment of the two major political parties in Honduras
and the opening of the second Honduran military academy. 3 The Liberal Party (1891) and the National
Party (1916) consolidated forces within their factions in efforts to gain state control behind vaguely
defined political principles.

4

The first “military President” General Terencio Sierra sought to

professionalize the splintered militia factions in 1899, but failed to stop the frequent turnover within the
officer corps. From 1903-1906, 90 of the Military Academy’s 195 cadets had deserted, or were released
for illness or bad conduct.5 The lack of resources and ultimate lack of commitment by the state limited the
military’s ability to professionalize and further linked individual forces to controlling political factions.
Political stability during the Tiburcio Carías Andino administration (1933-1949) initiated the first
modernization and professionalization of the Honduran Armed Forces. However, this did not de-politicize
the military; instead it became increasingly linked to the National Party. Carías, whose primary foreign
1

See: William Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950),
226-227.
2
See: Steve Ropp, “The Honduran Army in the Sociopolitical Evolution of the Honduran State,” The Americas 30, no. 4
(April 1974): 505-506.
3
The first Colegio Militar del Ejército was established in 1826. The Academia Militar was created in 1881.
4
See: Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government, 226.
5
Ropp, “The Honduran Army in the Sociopolitical Evolution of the Honduran State,” 508.
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policy goal was to develop and maintain ties to the United States, provided favorable conditions to U.S.
controlled banana companies while supporting U.S. ventures into Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. 6
Increased U.S. military aid both strengthened ties between the two countries and provided the financial
and political stability necessary to develop a dependable military institution.
Weaker than its regional neighbors, the country, and by extension its military, found itself defined
by its struggle to assert physical and political control over its territory. Honduras’ neighbors constantly
intervened or supported Honduran exile invasions to establish governments favorable to them. Defense of
territorial integrity thus became a key defining element of military identity.
In the post-WWII period the Honduran military became an important political actor. The U.S.
pressured Carías against running for president in 1948 with the expectation that Carías’ handpicked
successor from the National Party would succeed him. Nevertheless, the Honduran military continued to
professionalize under U.S. training and sustained U.S. military aid. The relative weakness of political
parties following the Carías era limited the civilian leadership’s ability to counter internal conflict leaving
the now professional and highly trained armed forces as the main political power in Honduran society.7
During the twentieth century, two images of Honduras dominated popular press accounts: the
banana republic and the militarized state. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the popular
press regularly referred to Honduras as the quintessential “banana-republic.” During the second half the
narrative most often focused on military governments, human rights abuses by the security forces, and the
U.S.-Honduran alliance against communism.
The alliance with the United States to fight communist expansion was a defining characteristic of
the Honduran military ethos. The Armed Forces of Honduras emerged as a professional institution and
political power at the height of the Cold War in the 1950s. The process was institutionalized in 1954
through a new law that led to the professionalization of the military, the signing of bilateral aid agreements
with the United States, and the creation of the first infantry battalion.
The October 1956 coup by Julio Lozano Díaz marked the military’s first direct venture into
Honduran politics, but it would not be the last. The military junta lasted nearly a year before negotiating
a constitutional guarantee of institutional autonomy and overseeing the election of Liberal President
Ramón Villeda Morales. 8 The constitutional changes deprived Villeda of the authority to choose or

6

See: Thomas Dodd, Tiburcio Carías: Portrait of a Honduran Political Leader (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: LSU Press, 2005),
153.
7
See: James Morris, “Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers,” The Americas 42, no. 1 (July 1985).
8
J. Mark Ruhl, “Honduras: Militarism and Democratization in Troubled Waters,” in Repression, Resistance, and Democratic
Transition in Central America, eds. Thomas Walker and Ariel Armony (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources
Incorporated, 2000), 49-50.
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remove the chief of the armed forces.9 Villeda faced conservative opposition by large landowners as well
as fruit companies countering agrarian reform and increasing social programs. Colonel Armando
Velásquez Cerrato, who lost the 1956 elections, organized a series of revolts with the National Police to
counter Villeda’s policies. In turn, Villeda dissolved the National Police and developed a Civil Guard
under the control of the Ministry of Government and Justice. 10
The 1957 Constitution gave direct command over the troops to the Chief of the Armed Forces not
to the President of the Republic. It was in the 1957 Constitution that the armed forces obtained institutional
autonomy. For the next 30 years the military maintained a hegemonic control over the political system
and a monopoly in the control of the defense and security apparatus.
The dissolution of the National Police in favor of a Civil Guard combined with reform minded
Liberal factions threatened the military’s autonomy. The 1963 elections represented a threat to the military
as it appeared likely the Liberal candidate, Modesto Rodas Alvarado, would be elected. Rodas was more
radical than Villeda, having organized rallies in small villages against the “National Party’s military.” 11
Anticipating conflict under a Rodas administration, Air Force Colonel Oswaldo López Arellano led a
military coup ten days prior to the election, seizing control of the state and consolidating the armed forces’
alliance with the National Party. 12
Arellano remained in power through 1971 further politicizing the armed forces and strengthening
ties with the National Party. He had a twofold approach: modernize and strengthen the armed forces and
suppress domestic dissent.13 For the former, Arellano positioned the armed forces closely to National
Party leadership strengthening the institution’s autonomy. For the latter, the administration would use El
Salvador as a scapegoat for the economic problems facing Hondurans, and subsequently expelling
thousands of Salvadorans living along the border.14 This expulsion culminated in the Soccer War in 1969
with El Salvador invading Honduras. While brief, the war highlighted the strength of the Honduran Air
Force, and revealed critical weaknesses within the Army. 15 The war has marked Honduran military culture
since the late 1960s. Honduras lost nearly 250 combat troops and over 2,000 civilians. Salvadorian troops
came within a few kilometers of Tegucigalpa before the Honduran Air Force slowed their advance.

9

Ibid.
Morris, “Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers.”
11
Lucas Paredes, “Liberalismo y nacionalismo: (Transfuguismo político)” (Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Imprenta Honduras,
1963).
12
Ruhl, “Honduras: Militarism and Democratization in Troubled Waters.”
13
Richard Millett, “The Honduran Military: History of a Conflicted Institution,” (Miami, Florida: Florida International
University, 2016).
14
Thomas P. Anderson, “The war of the dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 1969,” (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of
Nebraska Press, 1981).
15
Millett, “The Honduran Military: History of a Conflicted Institution.”
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Historical hostilities between El Salvador and Honduras were reinforced and the power of the military
was strengthened in both countries. Immigration and control of the border became a central concern for
the Honduran military. Institutional divisions were reinforced between the Army and Air Force with the
latter receiving greater technical resources and the former using its larger numbers and control of the
military hierarchy to establish further dominance over the state.
Following a brief civilian interlude, the military seized power again under General Arellano (19721975) and governed for the next decade. Arellano monopolized power, ruled as a populist, and disregarded
political parties.16 This consolidation isolated factions within the military leadership ultimately leading to
his removal and replacement. Army Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar Castro (1975-1978) reconstituted the
relationship between the National Party and the armed forces, while further institutionalizing the military
within the state. Melgar’s personal ambitions of becoming President of Honduras came to light and led to
his subsequent removal. 17 General Policarpo Paz Garcia (1978-1982), who served as commander and chief
of the armed forces, became president until Civil Wars in neighboring states and insistence from the
United States would pressure the military regime to transition to democracy and civilian leadership.
The military reduced its role in the political arena during the 1990s but has kept its close proximity
to civilian leadership until today. Ultimately, the geopolitical environment shifted to one where Honduras
no longer faced external threats and the military was unable to justify its traditional role within the state.
Nevertheless, military leaders held close ties to the political leadership in the country (i.e., Arellano,
Melgar, Alvarez, and Vásquez Velásquez). The only constant, however, was the consensus among military
personnel that senior military officers should not pursue political ambitions; this led to the removal of
Generals Arellano (1975), Melgar (1978), Alvarez (1985), and Arnuldo (1990).18
The transition to democracy began with a process that culminated in the 1980 elections of a
Constituent Assembly which wrote a new constitution and approved it on January 11, 1982. The armed
forces played a significant role in this process. The constitution has an important role in defining and
codifying military identity. Military officers routinely refer to the text of the constitution to justify their
actions. While nominally subordinate to the civilian branches, the military’s status as a constitutionally
prescribed institution gives it significant authority vis-à-vis other institutions of the state. Having
constitutional rank makes it difficult to revise the mission, role, and corporate status of the armed forces.

Ruhl, “Honduras: Militarism and Democratization in Troubled Waters.”
Mark Rosenberg and J. Mark Ruhl, “Honduras: Democratization and the Role of the Armed Forces” in Constructing
Democratic Governance: Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean in the 1990’s, eds. Jorge Dominguez and Abraham
Lowenthal (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1996).
18
Rosenberg and Ruhl, “Honduras: Democratization and the Role of the Armed Forces,” 67.
16
17
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Unlike other Central American countries where military and police reforms were the product of
peace accords, in Honduras, reform resulted from presidential initiatives, institutional circumstances and
changes in the national and international context. As such, the changes are subject to setbacks as political
will and personalities change.
The return to democracy ensured the military’s departure from public life, but the armed forces
still maintained their political autonomy. Liberal President Roberto Suazo Córdova (1982-1986) remained
conscious of the military’s political power and hesitated to alienate military leadership during his
administration. Suazo allowed the military to control national security policy and maintain regional
policymaking, but preserved veto power on cabinet level appointments. 19 As noted by Honduran Colonel
Efrain Gonzales, military operations continued without the permission of the Congress or president.20
Additionally, the military maintained its immunity from the National Congress for any human rights
violations that occurred during the military regime. 21 Further, Suazo developed strong relations with new
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, allowing for the military
to conserve its privileges.
The 1982 Constitution guaranteed the military institutional and political autonomy. At the time,
presidential orders were issued only through the Chief of the Armed Forces, a position held by a uniformed
military officer. In addition, the president did not have the power to appoint (or remove) the Chief of the
Armed Forces; this corresponded to the Congress and the occupant was selected from a list drawn up by
the Superior Council of the Armed Forces.
In December 1996, the Congress unanimously ratified constitutional reforms whereby the
functions of maintaining internal security and public order were transferred from the Armed Forces to
civilian authorities, establishing a National Civil Police. Another important step was the drafting and
approval by Congress, on May 20, 1998, of the new organic law of the National Civil Police. On May 28
of the same year the National Congress approved reforms to Articles 28 and 29 of the General Public
Administration Act, which created the new Ministry of Security under which the National Civil Police
would be housed.22

19

Mark Rosenberg and Philip Shepherd, Two Approaches to an Understanding of US-Honduran Relations (Miami: Latin
American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, 1983), 13-14.
20
David Ronfeldt, U.S. Involvement in Central America: Three Views from Honduras (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 1989).
21
Rosenberg and Shepherd, Two Approaches to an Understanding of US-Honduran Relations, 13-14.
22
The failure of the National Civil Police to adequately deal with increasing violence and international criminal networks has
led repeated Honduran governments to increasingly rely on the armed forces to assist in domestic security functions. In 2014,
the current government of Juan Orlando Hernández developed the Policía Militar de Orden Publica (military police) as a
fourth branch of the armed forces with duties that straddle police and military functions.
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On September 18, 1998, Congress passed constitutional reforms that made the president
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces with the power to appoint a civilian to the Ministry of Defense.
Constitutional changes introduced on January 1999 made substantial reforms in the provisions related to
the armed forces. The amendments primarily consisted of suppressing the office of the Chief of the Armed
Forces from the Constitution. Under the reforms, the President of the Republic exercises direct command
of the armed forces. The orders given by the president must be carried out in adherence with the principles
of legality, discipline and military professionalism. Reforms established that the Secretary of State in the
Office of National Defense (Minister of Defense) would be appointed and removed by the president; the
same applies with the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, who was selected by the Board of
Commanders according to what was established by the Organic Law of the Armed Forces. The duties of
the Joint Staff, which now constituted the operational unit of the armed forces, were reflected in the new
Article 283. The reform established that the Board of Commanders, which replaced the Superior Council
(COSUFFAA), was the key consultative institution in all matters relating to the institution and behaves as
a decision-making body and superior military court in matters brought to its attention. The Board of
Commanders consisted of the Chief of the Joint Staff, who chaired it, the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff,
the inspector general, and the force commanders. The constitutional reforms also envisaged the allocation
of new roles to the armed forces, such as: the participation in international peace keeping, logistical
support, technical advisory missions, and communications and transportation in the fight against drug
trafficking; the armed forces would assist with natural disasters and emergency situations affecting people
and property; and they should cooperate with other institutions to combat terrorism, arms trafficking, and
organized crime.
The constitutional provisions raise questions about the nature of military subordination to civilian
authorities through contradictory and vague provisions. This situation made the political crisis of 2009 far
more difficult to resolve and placed the military in the untenable position of becoming the arbiters between
conflicting civilian institutions. Since no constitutional changes have been approved since 2009, the same
legal ambiguity remains today.
Article 272 establishes the armed forces as a permanent, professional, apolitical, obedient and nondeliberative entity; under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the Republic. 23
Article 272 also defines the military’s role to “…defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the
Republic, keep the peace, public order and the rule of the Constitution, the principles of free suffrage and

Art 272: “The Honduran Armed Forces are characterized as a permanent, national, essentially professional, apolitical,
obedient and non-deliberative institution.”
23
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the alternation in the exercise of the Presidency of the Republic.” In addition to these functions, the same
article mandates the Army to help in “the custody, transportation and monitoring of electoral materials
and other aspects of the security of the election process” under the leadership of the National Electoral
Tribunal. Operationally, this provision is manifested in the executive transferring authority of the military
to the Tribunal seven days before any election contest and until official results are announced. Article 279
states in part that “the Chief of the Joint Staff may not be a relative of the President of the Republic or his
legal designees up to the fourth degree of consanguinity and second of affinity, and will serve for three
(3) years.” However, Article 280 says that the Chief of the Joint Staff will be “appointed or removed
freely” by the president.
The constitution generates legal contradictions in the relationship between civilian authorities and
the military. These contradictions are partly responsible for the political crisis that led to the removal of
President Manuel Zelaya in 2009. In an interview published by the digital newspaper El Faro, Colonel
Herbeth Bayardo Inestroza argued that from April 2009 the military was concerned because “[t]he
President [Manuel Zelaya] was using the Armed Forces as a political tool; and the fact that he was
popularly elected does not entitle him to commit a crime.” Colonel Bayardo said that “the problem occurs
when he [Zelaya] gives this illegal order of employing the Armed Forces to support the process for holding
the referendum.”24 On the afternoon of the 26 of April I [Colonel Bayardo] provided the Chief of the Joint
Staff an opinion that concluded that “legally, ethically and morally it was not possible to provide support
[to the President] because Article 272 gave us [the military] a role of guarantor of the Constitution, and
the alternation in the exercise of the presidency. And we as soldiers are not subordinate to a person, but to
our mandate, to the law.” Questioned about the unconstitutionality of extraditing Zelaya, Colonel Bayardo
asked: “What would be more beneficial, removing the president from Honduras or presenting him to the
public prosecutor’s office and risk a mob burning and looting forcing the military to intervene against the
people?”25 Therefore, the armed forces justified their actions during the 2009 political crisis under the
concept of defending the national interests, the rule of law, and the lives of the Honduran people. A retired
General, who served during the 1980s, was “very proud” of the military actions against President Zelaya
because he argued “Zelaya was violating the constitution and was handing the country to communists.”
The removal of President Zelaya was justified by Honduran officers interviewed as a “defense of
democracy” rather than a violation of it.

24

A referendum to the National Electoral Tribunal and the Supreme Court has been declared unconstitutional.
Carlos Dada y Jose Luis Sanz, “Cometimos un delito al sacar a Zelaya, pero había que hacerlo,” El Faro, last modified 2 de
Julio de 2009, http://www.elfaro.net/secciones/Noticias/20090629/noticias16_20090629.asp.
25
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Officers see the military as a mediating force defending the constitution and the nation-state
against external and internal threats. Those “threats” can be in the form of corrupt politicians or those who
abuse their authority. The military is clearly subordinate to civilians in operational matters but vigilant of
circumstances in which conflict among civilian leaders might undermine—in their minds—the integrity
of the nation-state. The Honduran Constitution reinforces this view and gives the military the authority to
act accordingly.

U.S.–Honduran Military Relations
No other military institution in Central America has had closer relations with the United States
than the Honduran Armed Forces. During the first decades of the twentieth century, Hondurans turned to
the United States for protection from its neighbors. In 1909, a U.S. facilitated revolution overthrew the
dictator of Nicaragua, José Santos Zelaya, in part because of concerns that he wanted to control Honduras.
Another U.S. involvement during political strife in 1911 was motivated both to protect banana company
interests and to prevent Guatemalan interference in the conflict. By the beginning of WWII, the U.S.
became directly involved in efforts to modernize the Honduran military, providing equipment, sending
advisors, and giving training to Honduran officers and enlisted men. This assistance led to the
development of the Honduran Air Force, whose officers were better trained than those of the Army and
whose equipment was generally superior. The difference between the Army and Air Force with regard to
training and equipment continues to define the attitudes and behavior of its respective members. By the
1950s, cooperation between the United States and the Honduran military became institutionalized as the
U.S. sought to fight communism in the sub-region. Increasing investments in Honduras by the U.S. would
organize and train Honduran forces, and provide the institutional support needed to be recognized and
respected as a military institution. The Escuela Militar Francisco Morazán was established as the first
professional Honduran military academy in 1952. Further military agreements between the U.S. and
Honduras provided continued training and military assistance. From 1950-1969, the U.S. or School of the
Americas in Panama trained over 1,000 officers and enlisted men. 26 Honduran military cooperation was
instrumental in U.S. policy toward Guatemala in 1954. Honduras served as a launching pad for numerous
U.S. operations in Central America. Most notable was the 1954 CIA led “Operation PBSuccess” where
Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz was removed from power. Assistance, both military and
development, increased significantly throughout the ensuing decades with aid reaching its peak in the
1980s.
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The investment by the U.S. was reciprocated in the form of Honduran subordination to U.S. and
military interests. Honduran national interests instead were shaped by supranational international interests
from the U.S., and submissive of Honduran “rational interests.” 27 In a sense, Honduran foreign policy
complied on two fronts. According to Honduran military expert Victor Meza, Honduras implemented its
foreign policy that complemented U.S. policy towards Central America, while domestic policy was being
dictated by the Honduran Armed Forces.28 This dual subordination would continue through the state’s
return to democracy.
In the early 1980s, Honduras became a staging area for Contra29 excursions into Nicaragua. The
Honduran government and military shared U.S. concerns over the Sandinistas’ military buildup, and both
the United States and Honduran governments viewed U.S. assistance as vital to deterring Nicaragua. In
1982, Honduras signed an annex to its 1954 bilateral military assistance agreement with the United States
that provided for the stationing of a temporary United States military presence in the country. Beginning
in 1983, the Pamerola Air Base (renamed the Enrique Soto Cano Air Base in 1988) housed a U.S. military
force of about 1,100 troops known as Joint Task Force Bravo (JTFB). Total U.S. assistance to Honduras
in the 1980s amounted to almost U.S.$1.6 billion, making the country the largest U.S. aid recipient in
Latin America after El Salvador.
The end of the Cold War and the winding down of the civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador led
to a shift in U.S. assistance. Assistance peaked in 1986 at $81.1 million, but declined to $41.1 million in
1989 and to just $2.7 million in 1993. While U.S. military assistance declined, the United States
maintained its presence at the Soto Cano/Palmerola Air Force Base. This acquired even greater importance
with the loss of Howard Air Force Base in Panama as a result of the Canal Treaties.
The presence and training by the U.S. professionalized the Honduran Armed Forces, but the
dependence on U.S. economic aid forged the relationship between the U.S. and Honduran militaries. The
Honduran military grew accustomed to U.S. economic support and acted in conjunction with U.S. aid. In
the minds of the Honduran Armed Forces, the relationship became transactional where the military could
stop trusting its own security efforts, and instead relied on prompt and timely aid from the U.S. in the
name of fighting communism. 30
The transition from military regime to democracy in Honduras was largely a byproduct of U.S.
pressures. Honduras received assurances by U.S. leadership that military and economic aid would increase
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if the armed forces agreed to return to the barracks. 31 The U.S. feared a potential threat of Civil War in
Honduras which would result in the loss of a geostrategic stronghold. For Honduras, however, the promise
of increased aid provided the greatest motivation to transition to democracy. 32 Further, frequent funding
and training continued to raise the Honduran military’s professional capabilities.
The end of the Cold War diminished the military’s leverage to seek additional military aid. No
longer could the Honduran Armed Forces point to communism as an external enemy to maneuver for
increased aid. Instead, the armed forces faced pressure by the U.S. and international organizations (IMF
and the World Bank) to reduce military forces. Further, the U.S. sharply cut military aid to Honduras
throughout the 1990s, with U.S. Ambassador Cresencio Arcos questioning the role of the Honduran
military. 33 The Honduran military responded by arguing that Arcos’ comments represented another
example of the U.S. attempting to interfere in Honduran domestic affairs and “should be ignored as
such.”34 Nevertheless, the Honduran military in the 1990s reduced forces and continued to rely on the
U.S. for economic support for the state’s development, and later, in the fight against transnational
organized crime.
Relations between the two countries were strained during the 2009 political crisis. The U.S.
initially condemned the removal of President Zelaya, and then sought to work with regional partners to
return the president to power. Furthermore, the U.S. limited contact with the new Honduran government,
suspended $30 million of foreign assistance, and minimized cooperation with the Honduran military. By
November 2009, the Obama administration shifted the emphasis of U.S. policy from reversing Zelaya’s
removal to ensuring the legitimacy of previously scheduled presidential elections. Once the new president
was inaugurated in January 2010, the U.S. restored foreign assistance and resumed cooperation.
The AmericasBarometer35 2014 survey asked two questions related to trust and cooperation with
the U.S. military: Cambiando un poco de tema, ¿hasta qué punto confía en las Fuerzas Armadas de los
Estados Unidos de América? (To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States?). ¿Hasta
qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América deberían trabajar junto con
las Fuerzas Armadas de (country) para mejorar la seguridad nacional? To what extent do you believe
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that the Armed Forces of the United States should work together with the Armed Forces of (country) to
improve national security? The questions are originally measured on a 1-7 scale and then transformed into
a 0-100 scale where 0-represents the lowest level of support and 100-the highest.
The results of both questions are
presented in Figure 1. First, trust in the U.S.
military is significantly less than support for
cooperation with the United States. Second,
countries in Central America, with the
exception of Nicaragua, tend to express the
highest levels of trust in the U.S. military. The
data show that citizens in Honduras express
the highest levels of trust and cooperation with
U.S. Armed Forces of any country in Latin
America. Significant majorities of Hondurans
express trust in the U.S. military and support
greater cooperation with local forces to tackle
security challenges. These responses provide a
good base upon which to expand cooperation
between the two countries. While there are
sectors of Honduran society—the political left
and some NGOs—who oppose greater links
with the United States military, most Hondurans believe such links to be essential and positive for the
country. The reservoir of popular support provides a valuable asset to the United States as it moves to
strengthen cooperation and assistance to the Honduran security forces.

The Role of the Honduran Armed Forces
The role of the Honduran Armed Forces has shifted since independence in 1838. As previously
mentioned, internal political conflict remained the premier threat to state stability throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth century. It would not be until the post-WWII period where external threats
superseded internal conflict. This coincided with the professionalization, institutionalization, and
increased politicization of the Honduran Armed Forces.
Honduras served as the geostrategic capital for the fights against communism in Central America.
In conjunction with the United States, the Honduran military supported efforts to combat communist
17

threats in nearby Costa Rica (1948), Guatemala (1954), El Salvador (1980s), and Nicaragua (1980s).36
These communist threats justified both the existence and expansion of the Honduran Armed Forces.
Additionally, such threats created an “outward security vision” for the Honduran military that remains
today.
While the Soviet Union—and communism broadly speaking—remained the United States’
greatest adversary during this period, El Salvador posed the greatest threat to Honduras. The migration of
Salvadoran Campesinos onto scantly marked border territory between the states created conflict among
civilians. 37 When economic downturn created pressures on the Honduran government to adequately
provide for its citizens, the government instead blamed El Salvador and the state’s inability to control its
population. Subsequent immigration laws would send thousands of Salvadoran Campesinos back to El
Salvador increasing tensions between San Salvador and Tegucigalpa. Finally, in 1969, El Salvador
launched an attack on Honduras in what became known as the Soccer War.
The death toll of the conflict did not compare to the rivalry that followed. Civilian factions in both
countries recognized the other as a true threat to their livelihood, and demanded that their respective
military institutions prevent future attacks from occurring. For the Honduran Armed Forces, the war
brought stability and a sense of nationalism within the state, and served to diffuse mounting internal
pressures on the military. Furthermore, the war justified the military’s role in protecting against external
threats and an ensuing arms race followed with its neighbor to the west.38
During the Salvadoran Civil War (1980-1992), U.S.-Honduran relations became somewhat
strained as the Reagan administration provided weapons and military aid to the Salvadoran government
to counter the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación
Nacional—FMLN) guerilla forces. In the minds of Honduran military leadership, the strengthening of
their enemy by the U.S. threatened Honduras’ long-term security. Nevertheless, Honduras continued to
support U.S. efforts to counter guerilla forces in El Salvador and the newly empowered Sandinista
government in Nicaragua. However, Honduran military leadership did not feel that the conflict with
Nicaragua was necessary or useful; it was the United States’ war and Honduras would be best served
protecting its border from Salvadoran invasion. 39
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Honduran-Salvadoran relations today remain contentious as the Honduran military still considers
El Salvador a potential threat. The delimitation of the common border is said to threaten the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of Honduras. This proved evident in recent years when Honduras and El
Salvador nearly went to war over perceived control of Conejo Island in the Gulf of Fonseca. Ultimately,
the rivalry with El Salvador remains the preeminent threat in the minds of Honduran military leadership.
The end of the Cold War left the Honduran military without external threats—outside of the
perceived threat of El Salvador. The downsizing of the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran militaries along with
the collapse of communism globally made it difficult for Honduran military leaders to rationalize their
large budget and Army. 40 The deterioration of public order and pressures on the military to reduce the size
of its budget and forces, fueled internal threats not seen since WWII. The National Police remained largely
under the control of the Honduran Armed Forces, but continued human rights violations finally led to
concessions by the military in 1993.41 The police force was then placed under civilian control in 1996.
As of 2016, the transition to combating internal threats has placed the Honduran Armed Forces in
an uncomfortable position. Communism has been replaced by drug trafficking organizations and gangs as
the preeminent threat to national security. Nevertheless, military leadership remains fearful of external
actors, especially with regard to territorial threats and perceives police duties as beneath them. However,
they remain willing participants in these police-like activities in order to ensure the protection of the state
and the constitution.
According to The Military Balance 2016,42 the Honduran military number 10,700 active personnel
(Army 7,300; Navy 1,100; and Air Force 2,300) and 8,000 paramilitary forces under the Ministries of
Public Security and Defense and organized into 11 regional commands. The largest of the paramilitary
forces, the Policía Militar del Orden Público (Military Police of Public Order—PMOP), has increased
from 1,000 in late 2013 to 3,228 in 2015, and is slated to reach 5,000 by the end of 2016. Military
expenditures increased by 186 percent between 2006 and 2015, the largest rise in Central America. The
increase funding has been possible because of a special “population-security tax” imposed in 2012 to
provide additional funds to the military, police, and intelligence agencies. A significant portion of
expenditures have gone to support military participation in law enforcement activities primarily through
the PMOP.
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SOURCES OF IDENTITY OF THE HONDURAN ARMED FORCES
An important element in understanding the sources of identity for a military institution is the role beliefs
of military officers. Military role beliefs refer to how the military sees itself as an institution, both in
relation to society and the other institutions of the state. Normally, role beliefs are a product of historical
and cultural factors, as well as institutional structures. In the case of Honduras, role beliefs are conditioned
by the country’s historical relations with its neighbors and the United States, and the military’s
constitutional status vis-à-vis the state and other institutions. Sovereignty and pride are the two concepts
that form the bases of the Honduran military’s ethos.
In examining the beliefs of military officers in Central America, notably Honduras, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Guatemala, we find that views can be clustered into three broad perspectives: (1) officers
who believe that the military should focus almost exclusively on traditional constitutionally prescribed
missions of national defense; (2) officers who argue for expansive roles in accord with national
development objectives and the notion of human security; and (3) those who see additional missions
beyond the traditional national defense as exceptional, temporary and mostly focused on public security
or “non-traditional” threats.43 Most Honduran military officers expressed views consistent with the third
group. They believe the military has a duty to provide assistance to the state to confront security
challenges, including policing functions. That assistance, however, should be temporary and not interfere
with the fundamental defense of territorial integrity. Honduran military officers believe in the missions
and roles ascribed to them by the constitution, and are keen to uphold their role as guarantors of
constitutional authority.
The weakness of the national police is the key factor for officers that supported a limited expansion
of roles focused on public security. Repeatedly, and almost unanimously, officers cited “weak and
corrupt” police forces as the main reason why the armed forces must assist in providing public security.
A Honduran Colonel argued:
Our police lack all the basic training and resources to confront the enormous gang problem in this
country…unfortunately, because of ineffective training they are susceptible to being corrupted by
drug traffickers or international criminal cartels. The police personnel normally come to the
[police] academy with very poor education and are not of the best quality students. Many do not
see police work as a noble career and they do not dedicate themselves to adequate discipline and
self-sacrifice. They simply want access to a job. These people then are very corruptible. On the
other hand, most military men are dedicated to a career….their [soldiers] training regimen is strict,
long and comprehensive….44
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When asked to name the most important mission for the military institution, the Honduran Colonel
said, “we are entrusted by the national constitution for defending the territory [of Honduras]….” When
asked to define what he meant by “defending” and the nature of the threat, the colonel clearly indicated
that tensions between Honduras and its neighbors, particularly El Salvador was a major concern. The
colonel was not the first or last military officer that mentioned territorial integrity in the conventional
sense as a major, or most important, challenge facing the nation. Weariness of the intentions of their
neighbors, born out of historical conflicts, still influence the attitudes of military officers—particularly
those who started their careers in the 1980s. Younger officers might have a different outlook—in that their
attitudes might be more amenable to cooperation with regional partners—but the educational systems and
doctrines taught at military academies continue to emphasize territorial integrity, “sovereignty and pride,”
and historical analogies are rooted in the experience of confrontation with the country’s neighbors.
The group that sees an expansive role for the military focused on duty to country, but interpreted
it very differently. A Honduran Lieutenant argued that the armed forces’ mission was to “do whatever we
have to do to protect our country…development, environment, drug trafficking, climate change, gangs,
helping the people in need….anything, anything our motherland requires….” His tone of voice
emphasized the word “anything” and he repeated it twice. These officers did not reject traditional roles
but expressed a perspective that saw the military as more than defenders of territorial integrity. In the case
of Honduras, expansive roles are tied to adherence to the constitutionally prescribed missions. Honduran
military officers are very aware—it is part of their training and education—that the nation’s constitution
grants them roles that go far beyond defense of territory, and while some officers are not anxious to go
beyond their basic mission they accept the constitutional mandates as a duty.
Officers who focused almost exclusively on traditional defense of territorial integrity tend to come
from older cadres and from the Army. These officers saw public security diverting the military from their
“historical” mission. Officers in this group argued that the principal function of the armed forces was to
defend the nation from her enemies. While acknowledging that “enemies” can emerge from a variety of
fronts, these officers emphasized that the military’s preparation, training, and commitment should be
focused on the “core mission.” When prompted to define the enemy, one mid-level officer argued
“deterrence demands that we be prepared to defend our borders and our territory.” When asked if that
meant against a neighboring country the officer shook his head affirmatively, said “yes” (raising his tone),
mentioned the country by name, and reiterated the uncertain nature of the geopolitical conditions facing
the country.
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While support for the idea of democracy was nearly universal, the critique of democracy was also
virtually unanimous and centered on too much freedom, corruption, and political manipulation.
Repeatedly, military officers cited corruption and politicization as major problems with democratic
regimes. The theme about corrupt, inept, and politically motivated civilians came up repeatedly and under
various conditions. Many officers displayed a significant level of disdain for politicians, particularly
legislators. One officer compared legislators to “leeches” (sanguijuelas) arguing that “they suck the
lifeblood from the nation and its people….” These attitudes fed into opinions about democracy in general.

Military-Police Cooperation
In Honduras, cooperation between the military and the police is extensive and has been common
since the early 2000s. Usually, the work is carried out by specific requests made through the Secretary of
Security. Article 272 of the Constitution of Honduras, establishes that the armed forces shall cooperate
with the National Police in the preservation of public order, while Article 274 determines that cooperation
is established through requests from the Secretary of State for Security in order to combat terrorism, arms
trafficking, and organized crime, as well as to protect the state and the Electoral Tribunal.
The organic law of the armed forces also provides for collaboration with the police. Article 3
(Decree 39-2001), which identifies military functions, says that one of them is to “cooperate with the
institutions of public safety, at the request of the Secretary of State in the Office of Security, to combat
terrorism, arms trafficking and organized crime, as well as in the protection of the powers of the State and
the National Electoral Tribunal.” This feature is also referred to in Article 34 of the Organic Law of the
National Police (Decree 67-2008) by determining that:
When the National Police cannot deal alone with special situations such as emergencies or cases
of force majeure or an offense against the internal security of the State, the Secretary in the
Department of Security may request support from the Municipal Police or the military, who must
provide such support with diligence and urgency, defining as well the situation for which
assistance is provided, the duration of such assistance and the material and human resources,
technical, financial and logistics that will participate in the deployment of the joint efforts. The
actions taken shall be carried out under the technical control of the police authority. The support
referred to in this Article shall be temporary, limited to technical cooperation, logistics and
personnel necessary, and shall conform to the guidelines established by the President of the
Republic through the Secretary of State for Security, through the respective regulations. 45
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Normally, joint patrols in cities consist of one police officer and two soldiers, with the police
technically in command. The fact is that military officers often take the lead because they are more
disciplined and better equipped. However, arrests are usually made by the police.
In order to strengthen police efforts, the government issued Military Police of Public Order Law
(DL 168, August 24, 2013). The law creates a militarized police force that straddles the two institutions
and authorizes the armed forces to increase their force by 5,000 personnel. The new militarized police
undergo the same tests—polygraphs and drug screening—that are being administered to the National
Police. The government envisions this new force as a rapid response unit capable of handling emergency
situations when the police and regular joint units are overwhelmed, particular attention is given to
recovering areas of the cities overrun by criminal gangs.
In 2012, the government established the Intelligence Troops and Special Security Response Teams
(Tropa de Inteligencia y Grupos de Respuesta Especial de Seguridad—TIGRES), under the Ministry of
Security (which is also responsible for the civilian police) and is being trained in both police and military
tactics to combat organized crime, and bring security to the most dangerous parts of the country. In June
2014, the first class of TIGRES graduated from a special training by the U.S. Special Forces Group 7 and
Colombia’s Jungle School. In March 2015, Green Berets, from the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne),
hosted members of the TIGRES at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.
A third institution is FUSINA (Fuerza Nacional de Seguridad Interinstitucional), which is a task
force made up of representatives from the country’s various security units led by a senior-level military
officer. FUSINA operates under the oversight of the National Defense & Security Council (NSC), which
includes the president, the Speaker of the National Congress, and the Ministers of Defense and Public
Security. FUSINA manages bodies such as an anti-extortion unit that controls phone intercepts and so far
has proven to be a good model of inter-agency cooperation.
For the military these missions have become routine and a means of gaining visibility and
resources in an era when internal security and non-traditional threats have replaced traditional defense
roles. However, military officers generally do not engage in these missions with great enthusiasm. As one
military officer said, “I did not train to be a police officer. If I had wanted to do that I would have joined
the police academy. I am a soldier trained to defend my country against her enemies. I am disciplined and
obedient and so I do what I am told.” The sense of duty was echoed by other officers who nearly
unanimously said they perform their duties with “obedience” but who described collaboration with the
police as a burden and a degradation of their mission.
Most military officers view the PMOP as a temporary institution until the National Civil Police
can be strengthened. However, the reality on the ground is that: (1) PMOP is credited for reducing
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homicide rates from a high of 90 per 100,000 people in 2011 to 66 by the end of 2014; (2) Most of the
new resources from the “security tax” are going to the PMOP; and (3) Corruption continues to plague the
police46 making sustained investment politically difficult. In fact, there is speculation that President Juan
Orlando Hernández is using corruption in the police to divert additional resources to the PMOP with the
desire to eventually replace the National Civil Police with the Military Police of Public Order. 47

The Defense System
Another source of identity is the
nature and structure of the defense
system. Particularly important is the
relationship of the elected civilian
president and the military command.
That relationship tends to be personal and
reciprocal. The formal structure of the
system is shown in Figure 2.48
Formally, the president receives
advice from the National Security
Council and is the Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces. The president
exercises authority over the military directly and can bypass the ministry. The Board of Commanders is
the consultative body, composed of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Inspector General of the Armed Forces and the General Commanders of the Armed Forces. Article 205
of the Constitution says that the National Congress has the authority to “set the number of permanent
members of the Armed Forces;” however, in practice, the legislature has never exercised that power. The
armed forces in consultation with the president establish the number, depending on their perceived needs.
It is important to understand that informal norms of behavior tend to take precedence over the
formal structures. Presidents are keen to promote officers who share their political agenda—if not their
political party affiliation. Lines of communication between the Chief of the Joint Staff and the president
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are essential for the system to operate smoothly, and they often bypass the Minister of Defense. The
ministry’s weakness not only stems from their lack of operational control over the uniformed officers but
because of the dearth of civilian expertise in defense issues, plus the tendency of the president to exercise
direct control of the military rather than rely on the minister. The civilian minister plays a purely political
role as the “advocate” for the military with the public and Congress. The ministry relies almost entirely
on the military for defense information, budget analysis, threat assessments, and personnel matters. Within
the defense system, the armed forces are the lead agency in advising on defense policy and do so directly
to the president. Since the Chief of the Joint Military Staff serves on the National Defense and Security
Council, they have a direct role in formulating policy.
The system of promotions based on age requirements to enter and exit different ranks and the
practice of promoting politically compatible officers, tends to create bottlenecks at various levels of the
military hierarchy. These bottlenecks often lead to too many officers within specific ranks, particularly
just below the highest levels. Mandatory retirement ages result in a certain level of urgency among staff
officers to reach important positions before they are forced to leave the institution. As such, perceived
political loyalty to the president is important in order to guarantee promotion. Loyalty, rather than thinking
outside the box or taking risks, is the means to leadership advancement.
President Hernández has relied on military officers to staff a number of important government
positions, even those outside of the defense area. While President Hernández did not serve in the military,
he attended a military high school, served in the reserves, and prides himself in understanding the military
mindset. Government officials with military backgrounds include: Amilcar Hernández, the president’s
brother and an Army colonel, who is a presidential advisor on security and defense. An important advisor
is former Special Forces officer, Oscar Álvarez, who served as security minister under President Lobo.
Álvarez is a Congressmen and leader of the National Party faction in the National Congress. General
Julian Pacheco Tinoco was appointed head of the security ministry. Pressure from the U.S. government
led Pacheco to retire from the armed forces. 49 Prior to his new assignment, General Pacheco headed the
Directorate for Intelligence and Investigation (DNII). General Nelson Willys Mejía Mejía became the
national director of the merchant Navy. General Manuel Enrique Cáceres Díaz was appointed national
director of the Civil Aviation Authority (DGAG). General Mario Hung Pacheco, former chief of the armed
forces, was named coordinator of an inter-agency team on prisons. General René Osorio Canales, former
chief of the armed forces, as presidential commissioner for the special economic zones (Model Cities).
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Rear Admiral Girodano Bruno Fontana Hedman, former chief of the Navy, as superintendent of the
National Port Authority (ENP). Colonel Carlos Girón Ayala as national director of the Honduran
Agricultural Marketing Institute (IHMA). Colonel José Francisco Bustillo Murcía named as director of
the Social Fund for Housing (FOSOVI).

THE HONDURAN ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY
To what extent does the mass public trust the armed forces? This is a basic question that reflects the nature
and level of legitimacy afforded to the institution. Trust reflects a basic attitude that a particular institution
is performing its functions effectively and meeting the public’s expectations. Without trust institutions
lack the ability to withstand scandals or to
successfully promote their mission in intrabureaucratic conflicts over policy or budget.
The connection between lack of trust and
resources creates a vicious cycle which can
affect the effectiveness of an institution in
the long-term. Weak institutions that
engender low levels of trust might get less
funding which in turn weakens them
further.50
The Evangelical Church has the
highest level of trust. The armed forces are
second, making them the most trusted state
institution. The National Police receive
levels of trust significantly below that of the
military, and below the mid-point of the
scale.
Of course, aggregate levels of trust do not reflect the actual level of authority and legitimacy that
the armed forces have in relation to other institutions since this is mostly based on the national context.
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An important element to measure the level of legitimacy and to gauge the context within which the armed
forces operate is to compare the military with other security organizations. Increasing levels of crime and
insecurity in Latin America, and other
parts of the developing world, have
prompted governments to employ the
armed forces in assisting police with law
enforcement. Police-military cooperation
is ubiquitous in Central America. 51
With the exceptions of Chile and
Uruguay,

the

military

receives

significantly higher levels of trust than the
police. The armed forces in Ecuador and
Guatemala receive the highest levels of
trust, followed closely by El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Mexico, and Honduras. In
Honduras the gap in trust is significant
and more than 17 points.
The gap in trust levels between the
armed forces and the police affects the
context within which resource battles
between security agencies are fought. In
countries where the police are viewed as deficient, either because of corruption, ineffectiveness or both,
the distribution of resources tends to follow public opinion as political leaders will want to support those
institutions that are “popular.” This phenomenon creates a dynamic in which the police are starved for
resources and thus are less able to develop institutional competencies. High levels of trust relative to other
state institutions promotes the armed forces as an all-purpose institution used to fill the capacity gaps
within the state apparatus, not just in terms of security but potentially in other areas as well. Increasing
rates of crime and violence, low levels of trust in the police and high levels of confidence in the military
tend to promote the use of the armed forces in domestic security missions. While national constitutions
often provide for the use of the military in exceptional circumstances to assist law enforcement agencies,
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the fact is that in many Latin American countries domestic security missions have become routine and
integral to the implementation of “mano dura” policies.52

Public Support for Using the Military to Combat Crime and Violence
The AmericasBarometer asked the following question: ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en
desacuerdo que las Fuerzas armadas
deben participar en el combate del
crimen y de la violencia en (país)?” [To
what

extent do you support the

involvement of the Armed Forces to
combat

crime

and

violence

in

(country)?]. The question is measured
originally with a 1-7 scale, where 1
represents “strongly disagree” and 7
“strongly agree.” The question is then
recoded for better illustration and
analysis into a 0-100 scale where 0
means no support for the military
combating crime and 100 represents
strong support.
Figure 5 shows the average
score on the 0-100 scale for each
country in the analysis. We can observe
that there is positive support for the
armed forces to participate in public
security missions in all the countries.
Over 80 percent of Hondurans express support for military involvement in crime prevention. As seen
Orlando J. Perez, “Gang Violence and Insecurity in Contemporary Central America,” in Murder and Violence in Modern
Latin America, eds. Eric A. Johnson, Ricardo Salvatore, and Pieter Spierenburg (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell,
2013).; José M. Cruz, “Pandillas y capital social en Centroamérica,” en Maras y pandillas en Centroamérica. Pandillas y
capital social (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 2004).; Caroline Moser, Ailsa Winton, and Annalise Moser, “Violence, Fear,
and Insecurity among the Urban Poor in Latin America,” in The Urban Poor in Latin America, ed. Marianne Fay
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2005); Joseph S. Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg, “Toward a Society Under Law,” in
Toward a Society Under Law: Citizens and Their Police in Latin America, eds. Joseph Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2006).
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earlier, a significant number of military troops routinely perform domestic security functions and
Honduras has developed a number of paramilitary structures that combine police and military capabilities.
It is clear these efforts are very popular among the public.

CONCLUSION
Given the historical links between the U.S. and the Honduran military, most Honduran officers are inclined
to support closer ties with the U.S. military, particularly if such cooperation will assist in carrying out their
mission. The problem arises with the operationalization of those missions. As seen earlier, the Constitution
of Honduras provides a plethora of roles to the armed forces. Most Honduran military officers see
conventional military defense of territory as their primary mission. In most cases they define such defense
in terms of dissuading their regional neighbors from challenging Honduran sovereignty understood in
conventional territorial terms. As one senior military officer told the authors, “as a sovereign nation
Honduras needs to be prepared to defend its territory and while our neighbors are mostly at peace today,
Honduras cannot let its guard down.” Furthermore, the officer alluded to the “threat of force” which a
military provides as key to “mediating inevitable [emphasis added] conflicts between our neighbors.” The
idea put forth by this officer and others—including some civilians—is that differences among nations are
inevitable and that negotiations must always be backed by the availability of force. Since the future is
unknown the essence of deterrence is having the ability to enforce a country’s position militarily if
necessary. Similar attitudes can be found among military officers in neighboring countries. Therefore,
U.S. assistance to and collaboration with Honduras—and by extension her neighbors—needs to be
sensitive to these regional dynamics.
Another consideration relates to the nature of the actual missions performed by the Honduran
military. A substantial portion of the armed forces’ mission today relates to domestic security, particularly
paramilitary activity linked to police functions. Therefore, closer cooperation might involve U.S.
assistance to units that currently do not receive it such as the PMOP. Working with the institutions the
Honduran government has created to deal with the problem of crime and violence might be useful.
However, many military officers are wary of police functions and might be skeptical of deepening such
roles through U.S. assistance or might view such assistance as diverting aid from defense missions.
Honduran military officers are often skeptical of U.S. motivations. They generally do not
understand the complex policy-making system in the United States, where separation of powers demands
consultation with Congress and often requires U.S. military assistance to adhere to clear and significant
legal limitations. They are embedded in a system in which personal rather than institutional relationships
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are the most important; a structure in which the president’s personal relationship with the chief military
officer is the key to civil-military relations; a system in which informal rather than formal rules structure
behavior. They have a hard time understanding a system in which institutional and legal barriers place
rigid limits on the military; a system in which personalities are subsumed to institutional structures and
legal parameters. Maneuvering through these sets of attitudes, while cumbersome, time consuming and
often annoying, is essential if cooperation is to be successful. Additionally, Honduran officers are
sometimes suspicious of the United States and are prone to ascribe Machiavellian motives to U.S.
assistance. They understand that U.S. policy is inevitably driven by U.S. national interests but they are
often doubtful that such interests are compatible with those of Honduras; particularly with regard to
regional cooperation and working with Honduras’ neighbors. It is important for U.S. personnel who
interact with Honduran military officers not to dismiss such attitudes as merely ignorance or paranoia. For
Hondurans these beliefs are real and they shape their interactions with their U.S. counterparts, after all
“perception is reality.”
History is very important to Honduran military officers. Historical memory, for good or ill, informs
their attitude toward neighbors and the United States. For some military officers the United States is too
driven by present circumstances. The U.S. is seen as too eager to dismiss the past. First, historical
personalities and events shape their mentality and behavior. The history of wars, heroic leaders, famous
battles, and political conflicts all define how the Honduran military sees itself. These incidents, and the
myths surrounding them, are taught throughout the military education system, and serve as the basis of
military doctrine and values. Second, Honduran officers often believe U.S. policymakers are “ungrateful”
or focused on “what have you done for me lately.” They are very keen on receiving validation for what
they did to assist the U.S. to fight communism in the region, their participation in Iraq, and their recent
efforts to fight drug trafficking and criminal networks. Therefore, exhibiting at least a basic understanding
of the history of the Honduran military and acknowledging their “vital” contribution to advancing U.S.
interests in the region is an essential first step to better cooperation.
Finally, it is often a cliché that people in Latin America and the United States have a different
conception of time. This difference can sometimes be overstated. After all, many Latin Americans are
now embedded in a global economy that demands strict adherence to standards of work much closer to
the West. However, it is still the case that personal relationships are far more important than quick
decisions. Building those relationships take time and are essential to working effectively in Honduras.
Those personal relationships need to be nurtured through a process of continuous contact as well as by
validating the professionalism and institutional worth of the Honduran military. Honduran officers are
30

proud of their profession, role and history, and acknowledging this on a personal and institutional level is
necessary in order to promote mutual respect.

RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Build Mutual Respect and Confidence: In order to improve cooperation, United States interaction
with the Honduran military must be based on mutual respect and confidence. Taking time to
understand the historical and cultural bases of military ethos is an important first step. Understanding
and respecting cultural differences is essential for building an environment in which the Honduran
military becomes a willing partner.
2. Promote Partnership Capacity: The relationship should focus on long-term goals and strategy rather
than on resolution of short-term crises. Cooperation should be based on building capacity through dual
operations and training, and on mutual interests and respect. Holding the Honduran military
accountable for their actions or lack thereof is important in developing a positive accountable and
transparent partnership.
3. Promote Regional Cooperation: The problems of transnational criminal networks linked to drug
trafficking and terrorism go beyond national borders and require a regional response. The U.S. could
promote greater security cooperation by pursuing strategies that increase interoperability among the
region’s militaries, strengthening regional integration institutions and leveraging assistance, training
and cooperation from Latin American partners such as Colombia and Chile.
4. Support Security Strategies of the Government of Honduras: To the extent possible the United
States should assist the Government of Honduras in pursuing a whole of government approach to
security challenges. Modern security threats increasingly require multidimensional solutions. The
United States can assist to professionalize, equip, and train security forces that are flexible,
interoperable and capable of multi-tasking. U.S. security assistance can be valuable not only in
improving the technical capacity of the Honduran security forces, but also their ability to work
collaboratively and positively with the Honduran population.
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